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Historical ties and linguistic similarities between countries are highly correlated with outcomes 
in the financial sector.  Various types of linguistic relationships all affect information flows 
between populations, and countries with similar languages can more easily share ideas and are 
likely to have come from similar historical groups. There is evidence that linguistic factors have 
a strong relationship with bilateral trade, and I test whether this is also true for financial flows. 
Using bilateral data on the debt and equity flows between the 35 OECD countries in 2002 to 
2012, I examine the changing patterns of financial flows and language between countries.  I find 
that the relationship between linguistic similarity and equity flows is significant and large in 
magnitude before 2008.  After 2008, this pattern holds.  However, the relationship between 
linguistic similarity and debt flows is not strong before or after 2008. Despite integration under 
the European Union and institutions like the OECD, historical linguistic patterns of financial 
flows still hold in times of economic prosperity. 
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I. Introduction  
 Despite globalization and market integration under the European Union (EU), countries 
send more capital to linguistically similar countries than dissimilar ones.  Financial theory is still 
exploring why international diversification in Equity portfolios is not the norm, when the 
benefits from diversification are widely known (French and Poterba, 1991).  A similar 
relationship between language and international trade has been explored in depth (Melitz and 
Toubal, 2012-2017), but financial flows and trade flows follow different patterns (Nardo et al, 
2017).  The exact mechanisms through which language affects international trade and financial 
flows are still under dispute, and it is unclear whether linguistic differences act as a simple 
transaction cost (Melitz et al, 2008) or as a proxy for ethnic similarity and trust (Alesina et al, 
2003).  
 Using novel linguistic and financial datasets, I analyze the relationship between 
linguistics and financial flows.  As new datasets on bilateral financial flows become available, 
we can learn more about the patterns of financial trade.  Hobza and Zeugner’s “FinFlows” 
dataset provides a wide breadth of information by estimating the Debt and Equity flows between 
80 countries, but it is also incredibly specific by providing bilateral information to and from each 
of these countries1.  In addition to this, Melitz and Toubal have recently compiled a dataset of 
linguistic similarity between countries2.  They use this information to show that language is a 
complex variable that should not necessarily be simplified into a binary shared official language 
variable, as has frequently been done in the past (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2011). These datasets 
allow for an in-depth analysis of the patterns between linguistic ties and financial flows.  
In this study, I attempt to shed light on the relationships between language and financial 
flows.  I do this by examining various linguistic measures.  Since the OECD countries all have 
well-developed financial systems, as well as a wide variety of linguistic differences, I analyze the 
                                                      
1 This is initially provided in Hobza and Zeugner, 2014 and is further described in their web 
appendix: http://www.zeugner.eu/studies/finflows/.  They have also recently updated the dataset, 
as detailed in Nardo et al, 2017.  This paper also describes an analysis they perform using the 
FinFlows dataset.  As the 2017 data has not yet been published, I use the 2014 dataset.   
2 Melitz and Toubal compiled this dataset throughout 2012-2017, and their published paper in 
2014 analyzes international trade using this dataset.  Further details from the CEPII can be found 
here: http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=19 
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35 OECD countries3 provided in Zeugner and Hobza’s 2014 version of “FinFlows.”  This also 
allows me to focus on developed countries rather than the different financial markets that exist in 
emerging and developing countries.  By analyzing the period from 2002 to 2012, I am also able 
to gain some insight into the changing financial and linguistic patterns that occur during and after 
the 2008 financial crisis.  These changing patterns before and after the financial crisis provide an 
intriguing opportunity to analyze what factors may be the most important to financial flows in 
different broad economic conditions. 
While these analyses do not provide causal evidence of language affecting financial 
flows, they do highlight a significant, large in magnitude, and persistent relationship between 
linguistic variables and financial flows. At first glance, in an age of economic integration and 
globalization, it is surprising that language could have such a strong relationship with financial 
flows.  Despite EU integration, these linguistic patterns still exist, at least when the overall 
economy is strong.  Since one of the OECD’s goals is to “restore confidence in markets and the 
institutions that make them function4,” it is interesting to explore how these markets reacted to 
the uncertainty of the 2008 financial and following debt crisis.  The results of this study suggest 
that a deeper, causal analysis could yield valuable results about the nature of linguistic effects on 
financial flows, especially during times of financial crisis. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly explores the literature 
surrounding language’s relationships with international financial and trade flows.  Section 3 
details the main data sources I use.  Section 4 provides the methods of analysis.  Section 5 
analyzes and interprets my results.  Section 6 discusses limitations.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
II. Literature  
This research operates in the intersection of international trade and international finance.  
Within these two related fields, language’s effects have been widely studied, and many avenues 
through which language affects economic outcomes have been identified. The main ones 
                                                      
3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 




discussed include language as: a way to measure trust and ethnic ties between linguistic 
populations (Guiso et al, 2006; Tabellini, 2010; Desmet et al, 2011) and as a transaction cost and 
barrier to trade (Melitz, 2008).  Although much research argues for the importance of language, 
it is still not clear how to proxy and define a concept as broad as language.  Some use language 
as a binary indicator of whether or not countries have the same official language (Ginsburgh and 
Weber, 2011), and others combine language with other variables such as within ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (Alesina et al, 2003; Desmet et al, 2016). However, Nardo, et al (2014) have 
found that the effects of language on international trade are underestimated on the order of at 
lease one-half when language is measured through official language rather than more complex 
measures (Nardo, et al, 2014). 
To explore the mechanisms of language, Melitz and Toubal (2014) use five different 
measures of linguistic similarity. These measures describe the commonalities between the 
language populations in two countries, and they discuss how each identifies a different avenue of 
communication.  The five measures are common official language (COL), common spoken 
language (CSL), common native language (CNL), linguistic similarity based on the Ethnologue 
and Fearon and Laitin measures (Prox1), and linguistic similarity (Prox2) based on the 
Automated Similarity Judgment Program (ASJP).  The value of using multiple linguistic 
measures lies in identifying mechanisms through which language is used.  By using COL and 
CSL to capture the transaction cost/ease of communication mechanism of language and CNL, 
Prox1, and Prox2 to capture the historical ties mechanism of language, Melitz and Toubal 
provide a unique way to analyze language’s relationship with economic outcomes. 
Melitz (2008) describes COL to measure the presence of an overhead cost to 
communication.  If two countries share an official language, then there is no additional 
communication cost to the transaction (i.e. translation).  The people in these countries are already 
capable of sharing messages without incurring any additional private cost and so COL can be 
used to measure the “transaction cost” mechanism of shared language.  Melitz and Toubal posit 
that CSL measures the direct ease of communication while CNL isolates the ethnicity and trust 
mechanisms of language, since native language measures the language taught at birth and thus 
likely the language of the parents.  The linguistic proximity measures, Prox1 and Prox2, further 
explore the ethnic/historical ties inherent in the development of language by looking at the 
differences in the native languages themselves.  By isolating the various mechanisms of 
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language, these measures provide an interesting way to understand how differences between 
populations affect economic outcomes. Language is also an interesting measure that can capture 
how financial interactions vary at different levels.  Households engage in finance differently than 
large firms, and the mechanisms of language may capture these differences. With global firms, 
the historical or ethnic ties that language captures may not be as important.  These firms may act 
the same regardless of where specific firms are located since the global headquarters may govern 
business decisions.  However, at the household level, the transaction costs of trying to engage in 
a different language are likely much higher since households engage in relatively fewer financial 
transactions than firms do.  Additionally, households may be much more likely to value the trust 
that a historical or ethnic tie captures.  Compared to large firms that engage in many financial 
transactions and have market power, households have less information to make financial 
decisions.  Therefore, historical or ethnic ties may be more important to them as they attempt to 
invest compared to how firms make investment decisions.  Language is a useful way to measure 
multiple mechanisms important in making financial decisions and language can capture how 
aspects of these decisions change at different levels. 
While the precise way to measure language is still debated, the relationship between 
language and trade have become accepted such that it is now common to control for language in 
analyses of bilateral trade (Melitz and Toubal 2012-17). Although the geography of financial 
flows themselves can differ significantly from trade flow patterns (Nardo et al, 2014), language 
may have similar effects in both international trade and financial debt and equity flows.  These 
effects of language have been widely studied within the international finance literature, 
specifically within the context of the Equity Home Bias puzzle.  This ongoing puzzle highlights 
the fact that individuals and institutions disproportionately form equity portfolios of investments 
from their home country and rarely invest in foreign equity markets (French and Poterba, 1991; 
Werner and Tessar, 1995).  While the advantages of diversification in equity portfolios are 
widely known, there is still little diversification in equity portfolios through international 
investment5.  Theories of exchange rate risk (Adler and Dumas, 1983), capital immobility 
(Black, 1974), and information asymmetry (Merton, 1987) have all been analyzed as potential 
                                                      
5 Finance theory argues that investors in the United States can optimize their portfolios through 
holding 60% domestic and 40% international (Shapiro 1999), and yet United States investors are 
actually holding 92.3% domestically (French and Poterba, 1991). 
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explanations behind this puzzle, with information asymmetry receiving the most attention and 
support in recent years.   
The information asymmetry hypothesis posits that incomplete information between 
foreign and domestic markets leads to an investment bias toward domestic markets and away 
from foreign markets (Gehring, 1993).  This broad concept of information asymmetry can take 
shape in multiple ways and has been analyzed in terms of the influence that culture and language 
can have on financial transactions.  For example, it has been documented that Finnish investors 
are more likely to hold, buy, and sell stocks with firms that share similar languages and cultures 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001).  Furthermore, cultural institutes that promote familiarity with 
cultures and languages have positive economic effects on trade and FDI through increasing trust 
and reducing transaction costs (Lien and Lo, 2017).  The specific cases studied in both of these 
papers highlight the mechanisms through which language affect financial interactions.   
This can also be studied in a broader context of international bilateral financial flows.  
Studies have analyzed how institutions affect bilateral financial flows (Papaioannou, 2008) and 
how information frictions affect investments in portfolio equity and debt securities (Daude et al, 
2008).  Within these analyses, language is often used as simply a binary control variable – 1 if 
two have countries have the same official language and 0 otherwise.  Using the expanded 
linguistic data of Melitz and Toubal, I perform analyses of the relationships between financial 
flows and linguistic similarity.  Language is an interesting measure to analyze since it can 
capture some of the differences in people that could affect financial interactions.  Something 
must explain the Equity Home Bias’ persistence throughout nearly the last thirty year, and it is 
possible that cultural and ethnic differences could help us understand this irrational behavior still 
seen in financial markets.  Using new measures of linguistic similarity provide a way to capture 
these difficult to quantify differences.   
 
III. Data  
This project is unique in the use of two novel datasets.  For language, I use the Centre 
d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales language dataset, as constructed and 
analyzed by Melitz and Toubal (2012-17), and for financial flows, I use Hobza and Zeugner’s 
relatively new “FinFlows” dataset on the financial flows of countries in the European Union 
(2014).  Using these two datasets, I combine financial and linguistic data on the 35 OECD 
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countries from 2002-20126.  This allows me to analyze the patterns of financial flows in 
developed countries before and after the financial crisis. Table 1 reports the summary statistics.  
 
Language: 
While these measures of linguistic similarity are useful, it can be difficult to understand 
how they are different and how they are related to specific linguistic mechanisms.  In Table A of 
the Data Appendix, I describe examples of the linguistic measures for the United States, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, and Turkey.  COL is a simple binary measure where, in this example, the 
USA and the UK have a 1 for COL and Turkey and the UK would have a 0.  CSL and CNL both 
capture percentages of populations.  The USA and Spain have (0.96)*(0.27) = 0.2592 for the 
shared populations of English speakers and (0.16)*(0.99) = 0.1584 for shared populations of 
English speakers.  Overall, the USA and Spain then have a percentage of their populations that 
both speak the same language equal to 0.2592+0.1584 = 0.4176.  This means that 41.76% of the 
populations in the USA and Spain speak the same language.  However, in these samples, there 
are portions of the population that speak more than one language.  This leads the CSL measure in 
some instances to be more than 100%.  To account for this, Melitz and Toubal adjust the final 
CSL measure by CSL = max(α) + (α - max(α)) (1 - max(α)) where α is the initial raw CSL 
measure for each language.  Therefore, the final CSL measure between the USA and Spain is 
actually 38%.  CNL is calculated similarly, but the effects of double-counting are negligible 
since few people in the OECD countries are taught multiple languages at birth.  For Turkey and 
Spain, CNL would be zero, but between the USA and the UK, CNL would be 0.82*0.92 = 
0.7544.  This means that none of the populations in Turkey and Spain were taught the same 
language at birth but that 75% of the populations in the USA and the UK are taught the same 
language at birth.   
The linguistic proximity measures, Prox1 and Prox2, are based off of the CNL measure.  
These measures take into account the proportion of populations sharing the same native language 
and then compare the languages themselves.  In COL, CSL, and CNL, the measurements are 
                                                      
6 For Belgium and Luxembourg, the linguistic data was combined into a “BLX” variable that 
covered both Belgium and Luxembourg.  However, there were bilateral financial flows data for 
both Belgium and Luxembourg.  To be able to use these flows data for these two countries, I 
used the combined “BLX” linguistic data for both Belgium and Luxembourg individually. 
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based only on the differences in populations.  The linguistic proximity measures take this into 
account, but they also look at the differences in the language itself.  Prox1 does this by 
comparing the family trees of the languages whereas Prox2 compares the cognates of the same 
words in the languages.  The language differences between Spain and Portugal illustrate how 
these measures are different.  Spain’s native language is Spanish whereas Portugal’s native 
language is Portuguese.  Spain and Portugal have a Prox1 measure of 0.75, illustrating how 
Spanish and Portuguese are close together in the West Iberian Romance linguistic family trees.  
However, the cognates in these languages are different and so the Prox2 measurement is a much 
lower 0.42.  All of these measures range from zero to 1, where COL is binary and the other four 
measures are percentages.   
Melitz and Toubal describe their specific methodology further in their paper.  While these 
mechanisms of linguistic similarity between groups may intuitively make sense, the five 
variables are highly correlated and likely capture some overlapping effects.  Table 2 reports the 
correlation matrix.  Recognizing this, it is important to take care in interpreting how specifically 
identified these mechanisms of language are. 
 
Financial Flows: 
To study international financial flows, Hobza and Zeugner (2014) have compiled a 
database of bilateral financial flows between European Union countries and their major world 
partners.  Ranging from the years 2002-2012, they use this data to analyze financial flow patterns 
in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and the debt financing occurring through 2009-11.  In 
their analysis, they find that trade flows follow markedly different patterns than financial flows. 
Hobza and Zeugner initially use stock Balance of Payments statistics and then convert them into 
flows.  From these flows, I focus on the two main measures - Debt and Equity, as well as their 
sum, labeled “Value”.  Positive values represent investment into a country while negative are 
disinvestment.  Each observation indicates a bilateral Equity or Debt flow in real Euros (bn) from 
the “reporting” country to the “partner” country.  Debt includes portfolio debt, other investments, 
and the debt flows through the European Central Bank.  Equity combines portfolio equity and 
foreign direct investment.  They exclude financial derivatives from their analysis, since bilateral 
information is rarely available. They also account for additional flows through the European 
Central Bank.  This is key in analyzing financial flows in 2010-2012 as Greece, Portugal, 
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Ireland, and Spain received financial assistance from other OECD countries through the 
European Central Bank.  The instruments and assets that make up these measures are included as 
an appendix, and a detailed description can be found in Hobza and Zeugner’s online data 
appendix7.  This bilateral data allows for a specific analysis on financial trading partners.   
 
Controls: 
In any cross-country analysis there are a wide array of omitted variables.  By using the 35 
OECD countries, I can analyze well-developed financial markets.  However, there are other 
potential complicating factors discussed in the literature that I attempt to control for.  I include 
country specific fixed effects for both the reporting and partner country.  This means that for 
every regression I include dummy variables specific to the country sending the capital and for 
the country receiving the capital.  Including country specific dummies controls for anything 
specific to the country that is present in every observation of that country.  Additionally, for each 
observation, I control for reporting and partner country GDP per capita (IMF).  This takes into 
account the overall size of the economy and makes the outcomes comparable between countries 
with large and small economies.  I also control for whether the countries share a legal origin.  In 
this dataset, there are four legal origins (British, French, Scandinavian, and German).  The 
literature discusses how countries with British legal origin are more likely to have creditor 
protections that encourage financial growth than countries with other legal origins (La Porta et 
al, 2008).  I include legal origin to account for this as well as to account for broader historical 
factors that legal origin may proxy.  In some of the literature (Beck et al, 2002), legal origin is 
used to control for historical ties instead of language, but in my analysis I control for legal origin 
and instead analyze the various mechanisms of language through multiple linguistic variables.  I 
also control for the geographical distance between countries (Mayer et al, 2011), whether both 
countries are in the European continent, and whether the countries share a border.  This controls 
for some of the increased transaction costs that further geographical distance may add that can 
affect financial interactions between countries.  Lastly, I include the log of the reporting and 
partner country’s populations (OECD, 2018).  I provide summary statistics and a correlation 
matrix for all controls in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 





IV. Methods  
To isolate the various relationships between linguistic similarity and financial flows, I 
utilize multiple OLS regressions.  In each test, I perform two-way clustered standard errors, 
clustering on the reporting and partner country following the method Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009) use in a similar bilateral analysis and presented in Cameron et al, 2011.  Two-way 
clustering controls for standard errors present within groups but random across groups.  The two 
groups I cluster on in this analysis are the reporting and partner countries.  Within the reporting 
or partner countries, there could be systematic error that is unrelated to the other variables I 
include.  For example, there could be some reporting error in Germany’s Debt flows data that 
occurs in every year.  However, Germany’s reporting error would not be correlated with error 
reported by France.  Clustering in this way increases the standard errors and confidence intervals, 
leading to more accurate significance results.   
In the following discussion, Y is one of the financial flow variables (Debt, Equity, or 
Value)8, LinguisticSimilarity identifies the language variables (COL, CSL, CNL, Prox1, or 
Prox2), i is the reporting country, j is the partner country, and 𝝀 is the vector of controls 
described above.  I account for time in various ways, which will be described below. In the 
following analyses, I test each language variable individually9.  By using five variables 
associated with language and testing them separately from the others, I provide a robustness 
check of the relationship between language and financial flows.   
 
Pooled Cross-Section with Time Trend 
To first study the relationship between language and financial flows, I analyze a pooled 
cross-section with a time trend to observe the overall relationship.  I use the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜷𝟑𝝀𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗   
where Year is the time trend dummy for each year, reported for each linguistic variable.   The 
results are reported in Table 3 and are significant and large in magnitude for Equity.  However, it 
                                                      
8 I do not take logarithms of the financial flows variables because they are directional, with 
positive values representing investment and negative values representing disinvestment. 
9 I also test multiple language variables together in an attempt to isolate the mechanisms through 
which language acts.  This was not fruitful, but I discuss it in the limitations section.  
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seems there were significant flow changes in specific years rather than an overall trend (see 
Figure 1).  To further analyze this, I perform additional tests where I specify individually on year 
rather than an overall time trend. 
 
Bilaterally by Year 
One way to analyze the different relationships between language and financial flows over 
time is to look at each year individually.  In this analysis, I analyze the data bilaterally by year in 
accordance with the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝜷𝟐𝝀𝒊𝒋,𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡  
where t is each year from 2002 to 2012.  By looking at each year individually, I test how the 
language and financial flow relationships changes over time.  The results are reported in Table 4.  
These results have a wide variety of outcomes, but there seems to be some difference over the 
years.  The coefficients of the relationship between the linguistic variables and Equity seems to 
have a more significant and larger relationship in the years following 2008, while their 
relationship with Debt is minimal in most of the years.  Looking at the overall relationships with 
Value, it seems that there are only a few years where linguistic similarity has a strong 
relationship with Value flows. 
 
Pooled Pre- and Post-2008 with Time Trend 
To further inspect these relationships before and after 2008, I perform a similar pooled 
cross-section with time trend, but I separate the time periods into Pre-2008 and Post-2008.  The 
equation for this is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒2008 + 𝜷𝟒𝝀𝒊𝒋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
where Pre2008 separates the tests into the years 2002-2007 and 2008-2012.  Year is the time 
trend dummy for each year in Pre- or Post-2008 periods.  The results are reported in Tables 5 and 
6.  This indicates that Equity has a strong and large in magnitude relationship with linguistic 
variables prior to 2008 as well as post-2008.  Debt flows do not seem to be significantly related 
to linguistic similarity, but the significance does increase minimally following 2008. 
 
V. Analysis & Discussion  
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There is a significant relationship between the linguistic variables and Equity flows.  
Even when controlling for a variety of potential confounding variables, these results still hold.  
In particular, this pattern holds for all linguistic similarity measures even in terms of border 
countries.  Between border countries, linguistically similar countries are likely to send more 
capital to one another than linguistically dissimilar ones (see Figure 2).  For example, 99% of the 
population in Austria and Germany speak the same language compared to the 36% that speak the 
same language in Austria and Hungary.  Austria’s average Equity flows to Germany are nearly 
twice the size of Austria’s Equity flows to Hungary, relative to GDP.  Even though Germany and 
Hungary both physically border Austria, there is a large difference in the amount of Equity flows 
between border countries.   
In the overall pooled cross-section with time trend (see Table 3), linguistic variables have 
a general positive trend with financial flows.  The linguistic variables’ coefficients corresponding 
to Equity tend to be highly significant and large in magnitude.  If two countries share an official 
language, the amount of Equity traded between the two countries is 1,836 million Euros more 
than two countries that do not share an official language, all else equal.  This corresponds to 
more than a third of a standard deviation increase in Equity flows.  These results hold for Equity 
at the 1% level.  However, Debt flows are not significantly related to any of the linguistic 
variables.  Value is significant with COL, CNL, Prox1, and Prox2 but only at the 10% level.  
While Equity flows are significantly related to linguistic similarity, these results do not hold for 
Debt flows when analyzing the overall time period. 
Analyzing results bilaterally by year somewhat supports these overall trends (see Table 
4), but not all variables broken up by year are significant.  Within Equity, the significance of the 
linguistic variables is mixed, especially in 2003-2006 and 2008-2010.  However, the strength and 
magnitudes in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2012 resemble the previous pooled cross-section trends.  It 
is interesting that the relationship between linguistic similarity and Equity flows is strongest in 
2007.  This indicates that Equity flow patterns may change leading up to financial crises and that 
linguistic similarity is capturing some of this change.  Whether this means that it was simply 
cheaper to invest in linguistically similar countries or that countries were only investing in 
countries they had historical ties with and thus were more likely to trust is unclear.  However, 
there could be interesting Equity flow patterns directly leading up to the financial crisis. The 
Debt variables show little correlation with any of the linguistic variables.  Equity’s strength in 
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2007 comes through in the Value results.  However, most of the significance in the other years 
disappears.  
Pooling the Pre- and Post-2008 periods with separate time trends sheds light on the 
changing patterns between linguistic similarity and financial flows.  Generally, the linguistic 
variables are positively related to Equity flows prior to 2008 (see Table 5).  After 2008, linguistic 
variables are only related to Equity (see Table 6), with minor significance on some of the 
linguistic variables’ relationship with Debt flows.  Prior to 2008, countries with populations 
sharing 100% of native languages have almost two-thirds of a standard deviation more in Equity 
flows than two countries sharing no native languages.  This is significant at the 10% level.  After 
2008, this relationship holds with Equity, increasing in significance and slightly increasing in 
magnitude.  Two countries with languages sharing 100% of the same cognates have over half a 
standard deviation more Equity flows than two countries sharing 0% of the same cognates.  This 
is significant at the 5% level.  However, two countries with populations speaking 100% of the 
same languages share over a quarter of a standard deviation fewer Debt flows than two countries 
that do not speak the same languages.  This is significant at the 5% level, and only one other 
linguistic similarity measure is significant with Debt flows after 2008.  However, this may be 
due to the drying up of Debt flows after 2008.  The overall Debt flows change from 15.96 trillion 
before 2008 to 8 trillion after while the total Debt flows disinvested increase from 2.02 trillion 
before 2008 and 7.08 trillion after 2008 (see Figure 3).  Similar changes occurred in Equity as 
well, with overall investment decreasing and total disinvestment increasing.  It could be that the 
changing relationships between Debt flows and linguistic similarity may be capturing the overall 
decrease in total Debt investment and increase in disinvestment rather than a changing 
importance of linguistic similarity. 
The patterns between linguistic similarity and financial flows are seen both in the levels 
and slopes of the relationships.  Looking at the graphs in Figure 4, the general slopes of the Debt-
language relationships change direction before (dashed lines) and after (dotted lines) 2008. 
However, the intercepts stay the same or decrease.  There is only a slight level shift in Debt 
before and after 2008, but there is a large change in the slopes of the Debt-language 
relationships.  This change in slopes likely indicates the changing environment and potential 
omitted variables that could be affecting financial flows.  The slope levels off, but, as described 
above, most of the Debt-language patterns are not statistically significant.  In Equity, the 
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relationship stays largely the same, as can be seen in the general slopes of the dashed and dotted 
lines.  The intercepts stay the same or slightly shift up, which depicts the changing baseline of 
financial flows between countries if they have no linguistic similarity, holding all else equal.  
Linguistic similarity with Equity is significant before and after 2008, but the magnitudes slightly 
increase or stay the same.  This is demonstrated by the small increase in the intercepts of the 
Equity-language relationships after 2008.  The Value-language relationship intercepts tend to 
decrease and the slopes somewhat level off after 2008.  Value is showing the combination of the 
Debt and Equity relationships with language.  Even when analyzing these relationships with their 
respective 95% confidence intervals, these patterns all hold. 
The general positive relationship between linguistic similarity and financial flows is 
present before and after 2008.  However, this Equity relationship changes slightly in magnitude 
after 2008.  For the linguistic coefficients that are significant in relation to Debt after 2008, the 
positive pattern disappears, but the trends of the relationship between linguistic similarity and 
Debt after 2008 are highly variable.  This indicates that linguistic similarity is not the only 
variable related to financial flows.  Although Debt is somewhat negatively related to linguistic 
relationships following 2008, these results are not robust to all linguistic similarity measure.  
However, even when controlling for time trends, country specific fixed effects, GDP per capita, 
legal origin, geographic distance, border effects, European continent effects, population effects, 
and two-way clustering of the standard errors, these results hold. 
 
The 2008 Financial Crisis & European Debt Financing  
 One potential explanation for the change in the relationships between the linguistic 
relationships and Debt flows before and after 2008 is the Debt financing that occurred following 
the 2008 financial crisis.  Prior to the financial crisis, countries’ financial flows were not 
following similar patterns as countries’ linguistic relationships.  After the financial crisis of 
2008, the coefficients of language’s relationship with Debt flows change.  For this period, 
linguistic similarity was somewhat negatively related to debt flows.  In their 2017 paper using 
the FinFlows dataset, Nardo et al analyze this pattern of Debt flows between countries in the 
European Union.  They found that countries with a capital account surplus, ‘core’ countries, 
financed countries with a capital account deficit, ‘periphery countries,’ through Debt financing.  
They find that the current account balance of the Euro area never exceeded 1% because a ‘core’ 
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group of countries (primarily Germany and the Netherlands) with current account surpluses of 
nearly 6% of GDP financed the ‘periphery’ group of countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain) with collective current account deficits of nearly 7% of their combined GDP.  The 
leveling off of the slopes in the relationship between Debt flows and linguistic similarity after 
2008 is potentially capturing this changing behavior in Debt financing following the financial 
crisis.  However, even when I performed all of the previous tests while dropping all observations 
including one of the ‘core’ or ‘periphery’ countries, these patterns still persisted.  Therefore the 
changing linguistic patterns aren’t due entirely to outliers in the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ countries 
and are then also occurring in some of the countries that weren’t as instrumental in debt 
financing throughout the European Union.  
 
VI. Limitations 
 While this evaluation provides convincing evidence of a relationship between linguistic 
similarity and Equity flows, there are some limitations.  The main limitation is that I am not 
capturing any causal relationship.  While a causal relationship may exist between linguistic 
relationships and financial flows, my tests do not include an identification strategy to isolate 
these effects.  Despite this, these results are still strong, large, and useful in understanding the 
relationships between language and financial flows.  By examining these patterns, we can better 
create a causal model to examine the most salient features of the relationships.  This is something 
I plan to explore in further research by better identifying the pathways through which language 
affects financial interactions.  Specifically, it could be interesting to perform these same analyses 
but specify the level at which the financing occurs.  Linguistic similarity may be more important 
in financial decisions at the household level as opposed to the firm or country level.  Since firms 
and the country flows are likely much larger than household flows, much of the patterns in this 
analysis could be driven by the firm or country participants.  Additionally, the interesting 
mechanisms that language captures may not be present in certain firms. In global firms, even 
though the reported flows may be in a country like Germany, the firm headquarters may be in the 
United States.  Then, the linguistic similarity that would be driving business decisions in my 
model should be due to the United States and not Germany.  My model does not capture the level 
or financial interaction or the global relationships particular firms may have.  This would hide 
the relationship between household financial flows and linguistic similarity.  If linguistic 
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similarity matters more at the household level, then testing at this level could be a useful way to 
explore the mechanisms of language.  However, this data is not readily available in the FinFlows 
dataset.  In order to specify the level of flows, I would have to look at the source data used in 
FinFlows or find a different dataset containing this information.  While the question may be 
interesting, the availability of data specific enough may pose a problem. 
Using the five different language variables separately acts as a robustness check to 
language measures and their potential mechanisms. However, it is also possible that I am 
capturing reverse causality or that language proxies for other variables I have not included.  
Reverse causality seems unlikely upon further analysis.  If this is what I am capturing, it would 
mean that financial flows are driving the linguistic patterns.  This would imply a deep, historical 
trend of debt and equity flows leading populations to integrate and spread their languages.  This 
seems unlikely since linguistic development comes before financial development and since 
language is generally thought of as necessary to engage in financial transactions.  Reverse 
causality in this analysis does not hold much weight.  However, omitted variables could be a 
larger issue.  I attempt to control for this through my vector of control variables, but there are 
omitted variables in a cross-country analysis.  Since language is potentially capturing the 
changing Debt financing after 2008, it is possible that language is capturing something else 
before 2008.  I am unable to identify the specific mechanism that is driving these patterns, but, 
regardless of this, the relationship is still strong.  This indicates that there could be interesting 
underlying relationships present in a deeper, causal analysis.  
  Along with this, language’s relationship with financial flows could be overstated since I 
do not specify how much the English language drives this relationship.  English is sometimes 
considered the “language of business,” and it is possible that much of the pattern I found 
between linguistic similarity and financial flows before 2008 comes from communication in 
English.  However, this issue does not necessarily disprove my hypothesis.  English similarity is 
still linguistic similarity, and part of my analysis is also trying to identify if language is capturing 
“trust” between countries.  Even if English is the language of business, that wouldn’t necessarily 
mean English is the majority language learned at birth in a country.  If English is not the majority 
native language but business is done in English, then the native language measure may still 
capture other factors that play a part in engaging in business (i.e. historical ties).  Language in 
this analysis may capture more than the potential transaction costs associated with not using 
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English.  It would be interesting to explore English’s effects in particular in future research, but 
that is not the aim of this project. 
 Within the methods of this study, I wanted to develop a stronger econometric model.  
However, since the language similarities are constant over time, I could not perform a fixed 
effects panel analysis.  This would have been useful to observe changes in the financial flows 
over time.  Since this requires differencing, it would have made the linguistic variables 
meaningless.  Instead, I looked at the patterns specific to each year as well as including a time 
trend.  Additionally, separating the relationships into Pre- and Post-2008 allowed for some 
analysis of time specific factors.  By analyzing these correlations in different time periods, I’ve 
been able to capture some of these time related patterns without using a fixed effects model.  I 
also plan to include country fixed effects.    
 
VII. Conclusion 
Despite the OECD and EU promoting economic and cultural integration, language still 
has a strong relationship with equity flows.  The transaction costs of communicating through 
different languages may not be the only way language affects finance.  Historical ties and trust 
between populations may also affect finance on a global scale.  Even when analyzing multiple 
measures of linguistics, I find that linguistic similarity between populations has a strong 
relationship with financial flows.  However, language may be related to debt and equity flows in 
different ways.  Linguistic similarity and equity flows share a strong, positive relationship before 
and after the financial crisis of 2008.  This could indicate that equity home biases are strong, 
regardless of the overall economic environment.  Debt flows, on the other hand, seem to be more 
responsive to economic conditions.  Before the financial crisis, linguistic similarity and debt 
flows are not related, but this relationship gains some significance after 2008.  As Europe used 
debt financing in response to the financial crisis, the importance of linguistic relationships may 
have changed.  In an uncertain economy, the historical ties and lowered transactions costs 
associated with linguistic similarity may be more significantly related to debt flows.  Observing 
these patterns is useful in understanding how populations engage in finance.  Even while the ease 
of communication between countries increases due to organizations like the EU and the OECD, 
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B. Financial Flows  
 
Instrument Definition & Components 
Equity This measure of Equity includes portfolio Equity and foreign direct investment. 
 
Portfolio Equity: 
Equity comprises all instruments and records acknowledging claims on the 
residual Value of a corporation or quasi-corporation, after the claims of all 
creditors have been met, including: 
- Shares and stocks, participation documents, depository receipts and shares in mutual 
funds or investment trusts are included.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): 
Investment of more than 10% ownership of a firm.  Investments of less than 
10% ownership are considered portfolio Debt or Equity. 
- Debt: marketable securities (e.g. bonds and non-participating preference shares), 
loans, deposits, Debt securities, trade credit, and other account receivable/payable 
- Equity: concerns the shareholder’s funds. It contains acquisition or disposal of Equity 
capital, revaluations which are not distributed as dividends. It includes items such as 
common and preferred shares, reserves and dividends. The Equity flows include 
reinvestment earnings. 
Debt This measure of Debt includes Portfolio Debt, Other Investments, and the 
TARGET2 Balance Estimate. 
 
Portfolio Debt: 
Debt instruments are instruments that require the payment of principal and/or 
interest at some point(s) in the future, including: 
- Long-term Debt: convertible bonds into Equity, nonparticipating preferred stocks, 
zero-coupon and other deep-discounted bonds, indexed bonds, asset backed securities 




A residual category that includes positions and transactions other than FDI, 
portfolio investment, financial derivatives, employee stocks options, and 
reserve assets. 
- Currency and deposits; loans; nonlife insurance technical reserves, life insurance and 
annuities entitlements, pension entitlements, and provisions for calls under 
standardized guarantees; trade credits and advances; SDR allocations 
 
TARGET2 Balance Estimate: 







Figure 1: Financial Flows by Year and Transaction Type 
 
This graph details the financial flows of Debt, Equity, and Value over the years 2002-2012 in 
real Euros (bn) for all 35 OECD countries combined.  The box-and-whisker plots are shown, 


















Figure 2: Average Value Flows 2002-2012 between Border Countries by Linguistic Similarity 
 
This graph plots the linguistic similarity between bordering countries for the various common 
linguistic variables (excluding common official language since it is binary) versus average 
overall Value flows between bordering countries for the years 2002-2012.  This shows the 
pattern that countries tend to send more capital to the countries they border when those 
countries are linguistically similar.  I plotted this same relationship for Debt and Equity in 




Average Positive and Negative Flows Before and After 2008 
 
Positive and Negative Flow Sums Equity Debt 
Pre-2008 Investment (+) 4.95 15.96 
                Standard Deviation (0.005) (0.012) 
Post-2008 Investment (+) 2.57 8 
                Standard Deviation (0.005) (0.008) 
Pre-2008 Disinvestment (-) 0.9 2.02 
                Standard Deviation (0.003) (0.004) 
Post-2008 Disinvestment (-) 1.97 7.08 
                Standard Deviation (0.005) (0.009) 
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Figure 4: Graphs of Pooled Pre- and Post-2008 with Time Trend Regressions 
 
These graphs depict the regression analyses done in the pooled Pre- and Post-2008 with time 
trend regressions.  The dashed lines depict Pre-2008 patterns, and the dotted lines depict Post-
2008 patterns.  All lines are presented with their respective 95% confidence intervals in light 
gray.  The confidence intervals for Equity Pre-2008 are in light green.  Common official 
language is excluded from these graphics since it is a binary variable.  All linguistic variables 
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Table 1: Mean and variations  
Equity, Debt, and Value in millions of Euros (real, relative to 2012) 
























12,276 .193 .186 .020 1 
Equity 13,090 825 4,915 -86,224 112,155 
Debt 13,090 1,139 9,515 -181,546 229,567 
Value 13,090 1,934 11,417 -165,019 260,520 
Reporter GDP 13,090 34,022 21,073 3,660 115,762 
Partner GDP 13,090 34,022 21,073 3,660 115,762 
Common Legal 
Origin 
13,090 0.255 0.436 0 1 
In Europe 
Dummy 




13,090 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Geographic 
Distance 
13,090 5,363 5,249 161 19,540 
Log Reporter 
Population 
13,090 16.363 1.534 12.569 19.565 
Log Partner 
Population 




























































































COL 1.00                
CSL 0.47 1.00               
CNL 0.74 0.45 1.00              
Prox1 0.49 0.66 0.58 1.00             
Prox2 0.63 0.66 0.77 0.91 1.00            
Value 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 1.00           
Equity 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.55 1.00          
Debt 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.91 0.19 1.00         
CLO 0.32 0.09 0.34 0.25 0.36 0.05 0.06 0.03 1.00        
GDP_R 0.13 0.36 0.06 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.06 -0.08 1.00       
GDP_P 0.13 0.36 0.06 0.22 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.08 0.06 1.00      
EUR -0.09 0.20 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.09 1.00     
Border 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.29 0.03 0.03 0.19 1.00    
Dist. 0.95 -0.12 0.10 0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.82 -0.24 1.00   
Log 
Pop_R 
0.04 -0.17 0.09 -0.001 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.03 -0.21 0.01 -0.23 0.04 0.13 1.00  
Log 
Pop_P 





















Table 3. Pooled Cross-Section with Time Trend 
 
 
Equity Debt Value 
VARIABLES 




1,836***     543.0     2,241*     




 2,023**     496.9     2,418    




  3,321**     3,485     6,814*   




   2,126**     2,039     4,092*  




    2,455**     2,199     4,633* 
    (2.447)     (1.192)     (1.743) 
Year Time 
Trend 
9.788 9.788 9.788 7.298 7.298 -179.9 -179.9 -179.9 -196.5 -196.5 -204.2 -204.2 -204.2 -224.5 -224.5 
(0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.175) (0.175) (-1.433) (-1.433) (-1.433) (-1.469) (-1.469) (-1.447) (-1.447) (-1.447) (-1.500) (-1.500) 
Reporter GDP 
per capita 
0.00919 0.00919 0.00919 0.0101 0.0101 0.00457 0.00457 0.00457 0.00471 0.00471 0.0136 0.0136 0.0136 0.0144 0.0144 
(0.737) (0.736) (0.721) (0.779) (0.764) (0.0910) (0.0909) (0.0909) (0.0900) (0.0901) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.237) (0.237) 
Partner GDP 
per capita 
-0.0177 -0.0177 -0.0177 -0.0176 -0.0176 0.0653 0.0653 0.0653 0.0687 0.0687 0.0736 0.0736 0.0736 0.0783 0.0783 
(-0.807) (-0.804) (-0.810) (-0.779) (-0.779) (1.356) (1.355) (1.354) (1.367) (1.366) (1.527) (1.538) (1.530) (1.569) (1.569) 
Common 
Legal Origin 
98.60 223.9 104.1 103.3 -4.362 451.7 501.1 177.6 209.3 132.8 559.5 718.7 262.1 307.5 116.1 
(0.431) (0.873) (0.710) (0.463) (-0.0233) (1.000) (0.930) (0.476) (0.473) (0.317) (0.946) (1.009) (0.580) (0.550) (0.230) 
In Europe ==1 
-77.06 238.7 324.3 617.9 585.2 1,028 1,121 1,213 1,609* 1,563* 966.9 1,352 1,530 2,215* 2,144* 
(-0.196) (0.613) (0.983) (1.493) (1.477) (1.348) (1.384) (1.558) (1.716) (1.689) (0.959) (1.254) (1.564) (1.772) (1.762) 
Border 
Countries ==1 
1,427*** 1,460*** 1,558*** 1,695*** 1,673*** 1,937*** 1,960*** 1,846** 2,020*** 2,008*** 3,317*** 3,363*** 3,334*** 3,647*** 3,610*** 
(2.967) (2.972) (2.911) (3.238) (3.152) (2.602) (2.665) (2.460) (2.755) (2.685) (2.997) (3.030) (2.981) (3.269) (3.185) 
Geographical 
Distance 
-0.0694 -0.0602* -0.0374 -0.0396 -0.0362 -0.0667 -0.0642 -0.0364 -0.0417 -0.0406 -0.134 -0.122 -0.0716 -0.0798 -0.0746 
(-1.619) (-1.760) (-1.307) (-1.128) (-1.138) (-0.956) (-0.986) (-0.695) (-0.691) (-0.681) (-1.258) (-1.348) (-0.941) (-0.860) (-0.875) 
Log Reporter 
Population 
-223.2 -223.2 -223.2 -189.4 -189.4 -7,849 -7,849 -7,849 -8,018 -8,018 -8,527 -8,527 -8,527 -8,745 -8,745 
(-0.123) (-0.123) (-0.123) (-0.0994) (-0.0994) (-1.294) (-1.294) (-1.294) (-1.285) (-1.285) (-1.227) (-1.227) (-1.227) (-1.225) (-1.225) 
Log Partner 
Population 
2,444 2,444 2,444 2,411 2,411 -9,468 -9,468 -9,468 -9,491 -9,491 -6,420 -6,420 -6,420 -6,439 -6,439 
(1.152) (1.152) (1.152) (1.114) (1.114) (-1.225) (-1.225) (-1.225) (-1.182) (-1.182) (-0.822) (-0.822) (-0.822) (-0.791) (-0.791) 
Constant 
-55,180 -56,089 -55,690 -51,069 -51,091 652,707 652,513 651,733 688,130* 688,217* 662,366 661,293 660,835 704,978 705,000 
(-0.523) (-0.530) (-0.528) (-0.466) (-0.467) (1.636) (1.637) (1.635) (1.645) (1.646) (1.548) (1.546) (1.546) (1.574) (1.574) 
                
Observations 13,068 13,068 13,068 12,276 12,276 13,068 13,068 13,068 12,276 12,276 13,068 13,068 13,068 12,276 12,276 
R-squared 0.139 0.135 0.138 0.138 0.139 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.130 0.129 0.133 0.132 0.133 
 
Pooled Cross-Section of all 35 OECD countries for all years 2002-2012 with a time trend with multi-way 
clustered standard errors on the reporting and partner country.  Each column represents a regression in 
Euros (mn, real).  All regressions use a single linguistic variable, not all combined.  Controlling for 
reporter and partner GDP per capita, common legal origin, in Europe dummy, border countries dummy, 
geographical distance, log of the reporting country’s population, and log of the partner country’s 
population. Also include country specific fixed effects dummies for the reporting and partner country. 
Coefficients of control variables can be provided upon request.   
 
t-statistics in parentheses 




Table 4. Bilaterally by Year 
 
 
DEBT 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Common Official 
Language 
213.1 801.4 2,688 3,195 5,417 -251.8 -3,397* 323.3 -1,119 817.5 -2,715 
(0.0968) (0.376) (1.076) (1.248) (1.599) (-0.0820) (-1.647) (0.183) (-0.634) (0.708) (-1.087) 
Common Spoken 
Language 
1,378 2,054 3,042 3,057 6,908 2,550 -2,991 -3,036** -2,081 -1,558 -3,856 
(0.838) (0.917) (1.320) (1.088) (1.591) (0.742) (-1.583) (-2.231) (-0.992) (-1.481) (-1.521) 
Common  
Native Language 
-929.4 7,996 10,212 10,161 18,157* 7,087 -4,340 925.5 -3,243 103.8 -7,795 
(-0.373) (1.630) (1.524) (1.452) (1.917) (0.980) (-0.919) (0.287) (-0.690) (0.0633) (-1.150) 
Linguistic Proximity 
(Ethnologue) 
2,417 4,009 5,307 5,887* 9,702 5,843 -2,451 -993.8 -2,463 -443.8 -4,381 
(1.360) (1.109) (1.220) (1.745) (1.609) (1.062) (-1.056) (-0.640) (-0.991) (-0.264) (-1.357) 
Linguistic Proximity 
(ASJP) 
1,491 4,316 5,990 6,447 11,497 5,465 -2,826 -1,122 -2,433 -147.6 -4,491 
(0.852) (1.150) (1.221) (1.372) (1.621) (0.937) (-1.046) (-0.685) (-0.920) (-0.0900) (-1.265) 
 
EQUITY 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Common Official 
Language 
4,173* 335.6 42.19 1,649* 1,911 2,903*** 2,826* 1,665 2,246 2,238** 205.8 
(1.777) (0.410) (0.0458) (1.739) (1.133) (2.797) (1.706) (1.624) (1.602) (2.233) (0.184) 
Common Spoken 
Language 
2,141 1,611 757.1 1,183 1,276 3,822** 2,422 1,445 2,546 2,422** 2,628** 
(1.367) (1.497) (0.733) (0.713) (0.885) (2.112) (1.467) (1.147) (1.347) (2.042) (2.252) 
Common  
Native Language 
5,899* 622.9 915.5 3,093 2,341 4,957* 3,265 3,179 4,199 6,464*** 1,591 
(1.741) (0.604) (0.413) (1.490) (0.901) (1.698) (0.804) (0.929) (1.299) (2.675) (1.005) 
Linguistic Proximity 
(Ethnologue) 
2,957* 1,171 674.2 1,639 1,491 4,398** 1,805 1,875 2,871* 3,053** 1,449* 
(1.778) (1.352) (0.610) (1.096) (1.072) (2.338) (1.088) (1.061) (1.675) (2.200) (1.648) 
Linguistic Proximity 
(ASJP) 
3,064* 1,205 934.7 1,753 1,646 4,484** 2,654 2,194 3,063 4,061** 1,943** 
(1.717) (1.265) (0.746) (1.089) (1.159) (2.171) (1.087) (1.029) (1.500) (2.379) (2.009) 
 
VALUE 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Common Official 
Language 
2,868 1,137 2,730 4,844* 7,328* 2,652 -571.0 1,988 1,127 3,055* -2,509 
(0.904) (0.537) (0.973) (1.655) (1.868) (0.792) (-0.212) (1.094) (0.518) (1.879) (-0.957) 
Common Spoken 
Language 
2,404 3,665 3,800 4,240 8,184* 6,372 -568.8 -1,592 464.8 863.5 -1,228 
(0.923) (1.132) (1.425) (1.043) (1.725) (1.349) (-0.321) (-1.095) (0.180) (0.512) (-0.551) 
Common  
Native Language 
5,061 8,619 11,128 13,254 20,498* 12,044 -1,075 4,104 955.6 6,568* -6,204 
(1.179) (1.545) (1.479) (1.496) (1.889) (1.375) (-0.180) (1.043) (0.164) (1.898) (-0.987) 
Linguistic Proximity 
(Ethnologue) 
4,572 5,180 5,981 7,525 11,192* 10,241 -646.1 881.2 408.1 2,610 -2,932 
(1.527) (1.226) (1.404) (1.536) (1.660) (1.577) (-0.250) (0.412) (0.137) (0.944) (-0.932) 
Linguistic Proximity 
(ASJP) 
4,334 5,520 6,925 8,200 13,142* 9,949 -171.7 1,072 630.2 3,914 -2,548 
(1.456) (1.220) (1.361) (1.273) (1.670) (1.439) (-0.0549) (0.457) (0.187) (1.307) (-0.733) 
            
 
Bilaterally by year for all 35 OECD countries for all years 2002-2012 with multi-way clustered standard 
errors on the reporting and partner country.  Each cell (and its corresponding standard error) represents 
a regression in Euros (mn, real).  All regressions use a single linguistic variable, not all combined, for an 
individual year.  Controlling for reporter and partner GDP per capita, common legal origin, in Europe 
dummy, border countries dummy, geographical distance, log of the reporting country’s population, and 
log of the partner country’s population. Also include country specific fixed effects dummies for the 
reporting and partner country. Coefficients of control variables can be provided upon request.   
t-statistics in parentheses 








Equity Debt Value 
 
                
Common Official 
Language 
1,836**     2,010     3,593     
(2.089)     (1.066)     (1.629)     
Common Spoken 
Language 
 1,798*     3,165     4,777*    
 (1.758)     (1.402)     (1.664)    
Common Native 
Language 
  2,971*     8,781     11,767*   




   2,055**     5,527*     7,449*  
   (2.070)     (1.658)     (1.828)  
Linguistic 
Proximity (ASJP) 
    2,181**     5,868     8,012* 
    (2.008)     (1.521)     (1.699) 
Year Time Trend 
114.2 114.2 114.2 125.8 125.8 204.5 204.5 204.5 220.7 220.7 142.1 142.1 142.1 163.6 163.6 
(1.267) (1.267) (1.267) (1.313) (1.313) (1.437) (1.437) (1.437) (1.435) (1.435) (0.852) (0.852) (0.852) (0.897) (0.897) 
Reporter GDP per 
capita 
0.00159 0.00159 0.00159 0.00146 0.00146 -0.0228 -0.0228 -0.0228 -0.0252 -0.0252 -0.0141 -0.0141 -0.0141 -0.0169 -0.0169 
(0.0989) (0.0975) (0.0973) (0.0802) (0.0809) (-0.463) (-0.459) (-0.465) (-0.496) (-0.497) (-0.252) (-0.234) (-0.245) (-0.213) (-0.278) 
Partner GDP per 
capita 
-0.00765 -0.00765 -0.00765 -0.00801 -0.00801 0.0512 0.0512 0.0512 0.0537 0.0537 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.118 0.118 
(-0.298) (-0.302) (-0.295) (-0.308) (-0.307) (1.370) (1.319) (1.357) (1.390) (1.370) (1.575) (1.562) (1.558) (1.508) (1.568) 
Common Legal 
Origin 
67.84 220.5 111.7 82.69 11.60 858.4 880.3 297.8 446.6 255.2 943.2 1,089 373.7 520.1 244.2 
(0.226) (0.687) (0.510) (0.280) (0.0445) (1.302) (1.054) (0.694) (0.742) (0.489) (1.105) (1.013) (0.660) (0.657) (0.357) 
In Europe ==1 
-323.5 -8.142 68.55 311.9 263.0 -1,281 -933.8 -704.2 -751.5 -883.0 -1,574 -955.4 -648.4 -461.0 -628.8 
(-0.678) (-0.0187) (0.180) (0.612) (0.522) (-0.898) (-0.806) (-0.623) (-0.643) (-0.727) (-0.931) (-0.702) (-0.508) (-0.357) (-0.472) 
Border Countries 
==1 
1,451** 1,514** 1,600** 1,724** 1,714** 1,962 1,871 1,839 2,093 2,066 3,326* 3,280* 3,310* 3,691** 3,648** 
(2.343) (2.181) (2.173) (2.439) (2.371) (1.409) (1.342) (1.277) (1.484) (1.434) (1.952) (1.943) (1.890) (2.212) (2.133) 
Geographical 
Distance 
-0.0711* -0.0625* -0.0421 -0.0422 -0.0416 -0.158 -0.145 -0.0799 -0.103 -0.101 -0.224 -0.204 -0.118 -0.142 -0.139 
(-1.804) (-1.794) (-1.264) (-1.170) (-1.193) (-1.364) (-1.366) (-0.892) (-1.160) (-1.138) (-1.515) (-1.548) (-1.035) (-0.337) (-1.223) 
Log Reporter 
Population 
3,942 3,942 3,942 4,190 4,190 3,568 3,568 3,568 2,999 2,999 5,410 5,410 5,410 4,824 4,824 
(0.952) (0.952) (0.952) (0.938) (0.938) (0.298) (0.298) (0.298) (0.244) (0.244) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345) (0.296) (0.296) 
Log Partner 
Population 
137.5 137.5 137.5 -384.1 -384.1 6,886 6,886 6,886 6,794 6,794 6,070 6,070 6,070 5,457 5,457 
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (-0.0859) (-0.0859) (0.830) (0.830) (0.830) (0.801) (0.801) (0.575) (0.575) (0.575) (0.508) (0.508) 
Constant 
-296,311 -297,055 -296,707 -315,785 -315,673 -584,253 -585,949 -586,504 -608,843 -608,544 -477,500 -479,883 -480,232 -504,601 -504,271 
(-1.483) (-1.486) (-1.486) (-1.510) (-1.510) (-1.464) (-1.466) (-1.467) (-1.455) (-1.454) (-1.006) (-1.010) (-1.010) (-1.002) (-1.001) 
                
Observations 7,128 7,128 7,128 6,696 6,696 7,128 7,128 7,128 6,696 6,696 7,128 7,128 7,128 6,696 6,696 
R-squared 0.157 0.153 0.155 0.157 0.157 0.214 0.213 0.221 0.219 0.220 0.249 0.248 0.256 0.254 0.256 
 
Pooled cross-section of all 35 OECD countries for the years 2002-2007 with a time trend and multi-way 
clustered standard errors on the reporting and partner country.  Each column represents a regression in 
Euros (mn, real).  All regressions use a single linguistic variable, not all combined.  Controlling for 
reporter and partner GDP per capita, common legal origin, in Europe dummy, border countries dummy, 
geographical distance, log of the reporting country’s population, and log of the partner country’s 
population.  Also include country specific fixed effects dummies for the reporting and partner country. 
Coefficients of control variables can be provided upon request.   
 
t-statistics in parentheses 






Table 6. Pooled Post-2008 with Time Trend 
 
 
Equity Debt Value 
VARIABLES 




1,836***     -1,218     618.1     




 2,292**     -2,705**     -412.2    




  3,740**     -2,870     869.8   




   2,211*     -2,147*     64.13  




    2,783**     -2,204     579.3 
    (2.039)     (-1.623)     (0.376) 
Year Time 
Trend 
-43.55 -43.55 -43.55 -48.82 -48.82 29.67 29.67 29.67 30.95 30.95 -13.87 -13.87 -13.87 -17.87 -17.87 
(-0.626) (-0.626) (-0.626) (-0.679) (-0.679) (0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.226) (0.226) (-0.0800) (-0.0800) (-0.0800) (-0.0978) (-0.0978) 
Reporter GDP 
per capita 
-0.0282* -0.0282* -0.0282* -0.0287* -0.0287* -0.0441 -0.0441 -0.0441 -0.0448 -0.0448 -0.0723 -0.0723 -0.0723 -0.0735 -0.0735 
(-1.832) (-1.781) (-1.846) (-1.901) (-1.877) (-0.882) (-0.871) (-0.881) (-0.851) (-0.853) (-1.152) (-1.152) (-1.159) (-1.118) (-1.125) 
Partner GDP 
per capita 
-0.0740 -0.0740 -0.0740 -0.0766 -0.0766 0.0113 0.0113 0.0113 0.0127 0.0127 -0.0627 -0.0627 -0.0627 -0.0640 -0.0640 
(-1.260) (-1.258) (-1.257) (-1.262) (-1.262) (0.210) (0.209) (0.210) (0.223) (0.224) (-0.809) (-0.814) (-0.815) (-0.798) (-0.800) 
Common 
Legal Origin 
135.5 228.1 94.85 128.0 -23.52 -36.44 46.01 33.38 -75.50 -14.01 99.07 274.1 128.2 52.46 -37.53 
(0.540) (0.788) (0.483) (0.540) (-0.105) (-0.0800) (0.101) (0.0723) (-0.152) (-0.0284) (0.192) (0.481) (0.245) (0.0930) (-0.0666) 
In Europe ==1 
218.7 534.8 631.3 985.0 971.9 3,798* 3,587* 3,514 4,441 4,498 4,017 4,121 4,145* 5,426* 5,470* 
(0.258) (0.614) (0.796) (1.018) (1.008) (1.674) (1.649) (1.566) (1.621) (1.629) (1.589) (1.638) (1.657) (1.697) (1.713) 
Border 
Countries ==1 
1,399** 1,396** 1,508** 1,661** 1,625** 1,907* 2,067* 1,854* 1,933* 1,940* 3,306** 3,463** 3,363** 3,594** 3,564** 
(2.055) (2.112) (2.124) (2.270) (2.207) (1.690) (1.774) (1.687) (1.657) (1.671) (2.166) (2.239) (2.208) (2.252) (2.234) 
Geographical 
Distance 
-0.0673 -0.0574 -0.0318 -0.0365 -0.0298 0.0426 0.0332 0.0158 0.0315 0.0320 -0.0247 -0.0242 -0.0160 -0.00500 0.00221 
(-1.150) (-1.216) (-0.830) (-0.766) (-0.664) (0.453) (0.326) (0.159) (0.245) (0.253) (-0.180) (-0.189) (-0.135) (-0.0312) (0.0142) 
Log Reporter 
Population 
6,586 6,586 6,586 6,539 6,539 30,088 30,088 30,088 30,694 30,694 36,674 36,674 36,674 37,233 37,233 
(1.475) (1.475) (1.475) (1.540) (1.540) (1.372) (1.372) (1.372) (1.333) (1.333) (1.337) (1.337) (1.337) (1.302) (1.302) 
Log Partner 
Population 
18,118 18,118 18,118 18,400 18,400 7,012 7,012 7,012 6,613 6,613 25,131 25,131 25,131 25,013 25,013 
(1.087) (1.087) (1.087) (1.075) (1.075) (0.457) (0.457) (0.457) (0.404) (0.404) (0.933) (0.933) (0.933) (0.890) (0.890) 
Constant 
-322,423 -323,531 -323,072 -316,445 -316,626 -681,886* -680,278* -681,327* -686,454* -686,622* -1.004e+06* -1.004e+06* -1.004e+06* -1.003e+06* -1.003e+06* 
(-1.122) (-1.125) (-1.124) (-1.079) (-1.080) (-1.932) (-1.929) (-1.930) (-1.896) (-1.897) (-1.830) (-1.829) (-1.830) (-1.790) (-1.790) 
                
Observations 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,580 5,580 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,580 5,580 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,580 5,580 
R-squared 0.142 0.139 0.143 0.141 0.143 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.069 0.069 
 
Pooled cross-section of all 35 OECD countries for the years 2008-2012 with a time trend and multi-way 
clustered standard errors on the reporting and partner country.  Each column represents a regression in 
Euros (mn, real).  All regressions use a single linguistic variable, not all combined.  Controlling for 
reporter and partner GDP per capita, common legal origin, in Europe dummy, border countries dummy, 
geographical distance, log of the reporting country’s population, and log of the partner country’s 
population.  Also include country specific fixed effects dummies for the reporting and partner country. 
Coefficients of control variables can be provided upon request.   
 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
